Justice Stevens, delivering the opinion for the majority in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) wrote

"The cases sometimes characterized as protecting "privacy" have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."

In Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1996),

"It is evident then, that Eagle can have virtually no expectation of privacy in the events surrounding his guilty plea. By freely admitting his transgression in an intrinsically public forum, Eagle acknowledged before all his fellow citizens that he had committed a crime against the laws of Arkansas."

"We observe initially that state laws, such as Arkansas' expungement provisions, do not establish the parameters of constitutional rights, like the right to privacy, that are grounded in substantive theories of due process. Quite to the contrary, these precepts achieve their scope from "deeply rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution. Nilson, 45 F.3d at 372. With those thoughts in mind, we express our approval of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Nilson."

In Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995)

"Criminal Activity is not protected by the right to privacy."

"An expungement order does not privatize criminal activity. An expunged arrest and/or conviction is never truly removed from the public record and thus is not entitled to privacy protection. We hold that Mr. Nilson has no constitutional right to privacy in his expunged criminal record."

In Holman v. Central Arkansas Broadcasting Co., 610 F.2d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1979)

"No right to privacy is invaded when state officials allow or facilitate publication of an official act such as an arrest."

In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469. 494-95, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1046, 43 L. Ed.2d 328 (1975)

"The interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record."

In Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2nd 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986)

"A validly enacted law places citizens on notice that violations thereof do not fall within the realm of privacy."

In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court.

"Respondent in this case cannot assert denial of any right vouchsafed to him by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. That being the case, petitioners' defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed respondent's reputation, did not deprive him of any "liberty" or "property" interests protected by the Due Process Clause."

"He claims constitutional protection against the disclosure of the fact of his arrest on a shoplifting charge. His claim is based, not upon any challenge to the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be "private," but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner."

In Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 625 (1976)

"Plaintiff attacks the maintenance and dissemination of arrest records for persons who were never adjudged guilty of a criminal charge arising from the conduct for which they were arrested. However, the Court finds that the due process and right to privacy theories underlying the plaintiff's claims are so similar to those recently rejected by the Supreme Court in Paul that these claims must fall as against the federal defendants."

In U.S Dept. of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1 (1988), Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court

"There is no indication, however, that similar restrictions on discovery of pre-sentence investigation reports have been recognized by the courts when the individual requesting discovery is the subject of the report. From our perspective, however, it appears that the reasoning of the cases denying disclosure to third-party requesters would have little applicability to a request by a defendant to examine his own report."

In U.S. Dept. of Justice et al. V. Reporters Committee For Freedom Of The Press, 489 U.S. 748, Cite as 109 S.Ct. 1468 (1989), Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the court.

"As a matter of Departmental policy, the FBI has made two exceptions to its general practice of prohibiting unofficial access to rap sheets. First, it allows the subject of a rap sheet to obtain a copy, see 28 CFR 16.30-16.34 (1988)..."

"Although much rap-sheet information is a matter of public record, the availability and dissemination of the actual rap sheet to the public is limited. Arrests, indictments, convictions, and sentences are public events that are usually documented in court records."

"The Privacy Act (of 1974) provides generally that no agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of recordsä except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains."

"Our previous decisions establish that whether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for information is made. Except for cases in which the objection to disclosure is based on a claim of privilege and the person requesting disclosure is the party protected by the privilege, the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request. Thus, although the subject of a pre-sentence report can waive a privilege that might defeat a third party's access to that report, U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Julian, and although the FBI's policy of granting the subject of a rap sheet access to his own criminal history is consistent with its policy of denying access to all other members of the general public, the rights of the two press respondents in this case are no different than those that might be cited by any other third party, such as a neighbor or prospective employer."